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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to decide when a criminal conviction 
becomes "final" within the meaning of the limitations 
provision of 28 U.S.C. S 2255. The district court ruled that 
the period of limitations begins to run when a defendant 
can no longer take a direct appeal as of right. For the 
reasons that follow, we rule that a conviction does not 
become "final" under S 2255 until expiration of the time 
allowed for certiorari review by the Supreme Court. 
Appellant Michael Kapral did not file a petition for 
certiorari, but he filed his S 2255 motion within one year of 
the date on which his time to seek certiorari review expired. 
We hold that his filing was timely, and we will reverse and 
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Background 
 
Kapral pled guilty to income tax evasion, and conspiracy 
to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute at 
least 700 grams of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 
120 months of imprisonment and 8 years of supervised 
release on May 25, 1995. We affirmed the judgment of 
conviction on February 13, 1996. Kapral did notfile a 
petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme 
Court. 
 
On April 29, 1997, Kapral filed a counseled motion under 
S 2255 in which he claimed that his prior counsel provided 
ineffective assistance and that the resulting plea was 
therefore not a knowing and intelligent one. The district 
court did not reach the merits of Kapral's claims, however, 
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as the court ruled that his motion was untimelyfiled. 
Under S 2255, a motion must be filed within one year of 
"the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes 
final." The district court interpreted that language to mean 
that a defendant must file within one year of the date on 
which this court affirms the defendant's conviction and 
sentence. Since Kapral filed his motion more than one year 
after we affirmed on direct review, the district court 
dismissed his motion with prejudice. We granted Kapral's 
request for a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 2253(c)(1)(B). The district court had jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 2255. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 2253(a) and 2255. We review issues of statutory 
interpretation de novo. See, e.g., Stiver v. Meko, 130 F.3d 
574, 577 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. 
 
Section 2255 provides in relevant part: 
 
        A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion 
       under this section. The limitation period shall run from 
       the latest of-- 
 
       (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction 
       becomes final; 
 
       (2) the date on which the impediment to making 
       a motion created by governmental action in 
       violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
       States is removed, if the movant was prevented 
       from making a motion by such governmental 
       action; 
 
       (3) the date on which the right asserted was 
       initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that 
       right has been newly recognized by the Supreme 
       Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 
       collateral review; or 
 
       (4) the date on which the facts supporting the 
       claim or claims presented could have been 
       discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 
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28 U.S.C. S 2255. 
 
This provision creates a statute of limitations for federal 
defendants who attempt to collaterally attack their 
conviction and/or sentence pursuant to S 2255. See Miller 
v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 619 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that the one-year requirement 
for bringing a motion under S 2255 is a statute of 
limitations subject to equitable tolling, not a jurisdictional 
bar). It was enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which was 
signed into law on April 24, 1996. In Burns v. Morton, 134 
F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998), we held that "S 2255 motions filed 
on or before April 23, 1997, may not be dismissed for 
failure to comply with S 2255's one-year period of 
limitation," id. at 112, and we further held that, under the 
principles set forth in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 
(1988), a pro se prisoner's S 2255 motion is deemed filed at 
the moment it is delivered to the prison officials for mailing. 
See 134 F.3d at 113. Although Kapral is incarcerated, his 
motion was mailed by counsel and received by the district 
court clerk's office on April 29, 1997, which was after the 
Burns deadline. Accordingly, his motion is subject to the 
terms of S 2255's one-year limitation period. 1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Kapral contends that the district court should have deemed his 
motion timely filed on April 22, 1997, which is the date counsel 
deposited the motion in the mail. Kapral advances several arguments in 
support of this position, all of which we reject as meritless, although 
one 
warrants further discussion. Kapral claims that an employee of the 
district court clerk's office told his counsel that "the date that would 
be 
used for purposes of determining the filing of[a] Federal habeas corpus 
petition[ ] would be the date that it was mailed in the United States 
Postal Service using adequate postage." Appellant's Br. at 34. Kapral 
argues that counsel "reasonably relied" on that information and that, 
under principles of equity, his motion should be deemed filed on the date 
it was mailed. The record reflects that Kapral's counsel is an experienced 
practitioner who should have known or verified the elementary rules that 
govern the filing of a S 2255 motion. We reject, therefore, the suggestion 
that counsel's alleged reliance on misinformation from the clerk's office 
was reasonable. Cf. Kraft, Inc. v. United States , 85 F.3d 602, 609 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996); Gabriel v. United States, 30 F.3d 75, 77 (7th Cir. 1994). A 
counseled S 2255 motion will be deemed "filed," at the earliest, on the 
date it is received by the district court clerk's office. See Rule 3(b), 
Rules 
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Thus, we are called upon to decide when a "judgment of 
conviction becomes final" within the meaning ofS 2255, 
which is an issue of first impression for this Court. The 
district court held that finality occurs when a court of 
appeals affirms the judgment of conviction on direct review 
even if the defendant subsequently files a timely petition 
with the Supreme Court for certiorari review. The district 
court reasoned that certiorari is discretionary and granted 
in relatively few cases, and noted that "challenges by state 
and federal prisoners to their convictions and 
confinement[ ] are granted review only .45% of the time." 
Kapral v. United States, 973 F. Supp 495, 498 n.6 (D.N.J. 
1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 
district court then drew a distinction between an appeal as 
of right and a discretionary appeal. Since the latter was so 
infrequently granted, the district court reasoned that a 
defendant's conviction was final when the defendant no 
longer had a right (as opposed to a hope) of further review. 
The district court stated: 
 
       The Court [ ] declines to define final judgment of 
       conviction based on a prisoner's petitioning the 
       Supreme Court for certiorari. In contrast to the direct 
       appeal of right, petitioning for certiorari constitutes a 
       discretionary appeal. In exercising this discretion, the 
       Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari in sentencing 
       cases. In addition, having exercised the appeal of right, 
       the petitioner has had a fair opportunity to present his 
       federal claims in an appellate forum. Therefore, a 
       judgment perfected by appeal may fairly be deemed a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Governing S 2255 Proceedings in the United States District Courts; see 
also Gonzalez v. United States, 2 F. Supp.2d 155, 156 (D. Mass. 1998) 
("[A] section 2255 petition is filed upon the receipt of the petition by 
the 
clerk of court and a determination that it complies with Rule[s] 2 and 3 
[of the Rules Governing S 2255 Proceedings]."); United States v. Nguyen, 
997 F. Supp. 1281, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("[A] S 2255 motion is deemed 
filed on the date it is received (and perhaps lodged) by the Clerk of the 
Court."). Here, the clerk's office stamped Kapral's motion "received" on 
April 29, 1997, and Kapral does not dispute that his motion was received 
on that date. Thus, the district court did not err in treating his motion 
as filed on April 29, 1997. 
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       final judgment from which the S 2255 statute of 
       limitations begins to run. 
 
Id. at 498 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the district court based 
its definition of "final judgment" upon the improbability of 
successful discretionary appeal and the fair opportunity for 
review afforded by termination of appeals as of right.2 The 
district court further opined that "an equitable tolling" of 
the limitations period would apply if the Supreme Court 
grants a defendant's petition for certiorari review. See id. at 
499 n.7. 
 
Kapral argues that a defendant has a right to petition the 
Supreme Court for certiorari review and that the time 
needed to do so cannot be omitted from considerations of 
finality. Accordingly, Kapral contends that theS 2255 clock 
begins to tick only after the 90-day period to file a certiorari 
petition has expired. If a certiorari petition is timely filed, 
he argues, the clock would start to tick when the Supreme 
Court either denies certiorari or affirms the judgment of 
conviction on the merits. Notably, the government agrees 
with Kapral that if a defendant timely seeks certiorari 
review, the judgment of conviction does not becomefinal 
until the Supreme Court denies certiorari or affirms on the 
merits. Appellee's Br. at 18-20. The government urges that 
we affirm, however, on the ground that when a defendant, 
like Kapral, chooses not file a certiorari petition, his 
judgment of conviction becomes final on the date this court 
affirms it on direct review. Id. at 20-24. 
 
B. 
 
"We begin with the familiar canon of statutory 
construction that the starting point for interpreting a 
statute is the language of the statute itself." Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 
(1980). Here, neither "judgment of conviction" nor "final" is 
expressly defined in S 2255. We consider these terms 
seriatim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court was also persuaded by the difference between the 
wording of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1)(A) and that of S 2255. We will discuss 
that distinction below. 
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In federal criminal practice, "judgment of conviction" 
refers to a formal document, signed by the trial judge and 
entered by the clerk of the district court, that sets forth 
"the plea, verdict or findings, the adjudication, and the 
sentence." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1); see also BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 843 (6th ed. 1990) (quoting Rule 32(b)(1), the 
predecessor to Rule 32(d)(1), in defining "judgment of 
conviction"). Under Rule 32(d)(1), a judgment of conviction 
"includes both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence." 
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131 (1993); see also 
Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862 (1985) ("[T]he 
sentence is a necessary component of a `judgment of 
conviction.' "). A judgment of conviction is entered only after 
the trial court has completed the sentencing process, see 
Howard v. United States, 135 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1998), 
and thus the term is commonly understood to refer to both 
the conviction and sentence. 
 
Under S 2255, a defendant is permitted to collaterally 
attack both the conviction and sentence. See, e.g., 
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994) ("[C]riminal 
defendants are entitled by federal law to challenge their 
conviction and sentence in habeas corpus proceedings."). 
We have no reason to doubt that Congress used the term 
"judgment of conviction" in S 2255 in accordance with this 
well-settled meaning. Thus, S 2255's limitation period 
begins to run on the date on which the defendant's 
conviction and sentence become "final." 
 
As is evident from the district court's thoughtful 
discussion, and the position of the parties on appeal, a 
judgment of conviction could become "final" on one of 
several dates. These include: the date on which the 
defendant is sentenced or the judgment of conviction is 
entered on the district court docket; the date on which the 
court of appeals affirms the conviction and sentence or the 
time for appeal expires; or the date on which the Supreme 
Court affirms on the merits, denies a timely filed petition 
for certiorari, or the time to seek certiorari review expires. 
We must determine which concept of "finality" Congress 
intended in S 2255. Our inquiry is guided by our awareness 
that Congress enacted S 2255's limitations period to control 
collateral attacks upon judgments obtained in federal 
criminal cases. As the Supreme Court has noted, 
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       [t]he maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by 
       the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is 
       often wisely applied where a word is capable of many 
       meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended 
       breadth to the Acts of Congress. 
 
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961); see 
also Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) ("[A] 
fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, 
indeed, of language itself) [is] that the meaning of a word 
cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from 
the context in which it is used."). 
 
The government submits the following dictionary 
definition of "final" in support of its interpretation of the 
statute: 
 
       1. pertaining to or coming at the end; last in place, 
       order, or time .... 2. ultimate .... 3 . conclusive or 
       decisive: a final decision. 4. Law. a . precluding further 
       controversy on the questions passed upon: The judicial 
       determination of the Supreme Court is final. b . 
       determining completely the rights of the parties, so 
       that no further decision upon the merits of the issues 
       is necessary: a final judgment or decree .... 
 
Appellee's Br. at 18 (quoting WEBSTER' S ENCYCLOPEDIC 
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE532 (1989 
ed.)); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 629 (6th ed. 1990) 
(defining "final" as "[l]ast; conclusive; decisive; definitive; 
terminated; completed" and defining "final decision or 
judgment" as "[o]ne which leaves nothing open to further 
dispute and which sets at rest cause of action between the 
parties. One which settles rights of parties respecting the 
subject matter of the suit and which concludes them until 
it is reversed or set aside.... Also, a decision from which no 
appeal or writ of error can be taken."). 
 
We agree with the government's analysis that, when a 
defendant files a timely petition for certiorari review, the 
defendant's judgment of conviction does not become"final" 
until the Supreme Court acts. Until then it cannot be said 
that the determination of the court of appeals is"final" 
within the context of S 2255, a provision that authorizes the 
commencement of a collateral attack upon a judgment of 
 
                                8 
  
conviction. It is the action of the Supreme Court in ruling 
on the certiorari petition that brings about closure on direct 
review and elevates the decision of the court of appeals to 
a level of finality that is "the last in place, order or time," 
"precludes further controversy on the questions passed 
upon," and is "a decision from which no appeal or writ of 
error can be taken." 
 
It is, of course, true that when a court of appeals issues 
its judgment on direct review, the resulting mandate is 
"final" in the sense that it leaves nothing left to be decided 
on the merits. However, the decision of the district court is 
final in the same sense, and no less worthy of being 
considered "conclusive or decisive" by that measure. Both 
judgments are subject to further review, and wefind, 
therefore, that neither is "final" within the meaning of 
S 2255. Section 2255 is a provision that authorizes the 
commencement of a collateral attack upon a judgment of 
conviction. Accordingly, it is clear that "final," as used in 
S 2255, refers to the decision on direct review that 
"precludes further controversy on the questions passed 
upon," the one "from which no appeal or writ of error can 
be taken." We are persuaded that Congress intended this 
concept of finality to control petitions filed under S 2255's 
one-year limitations period. 
 
As noted, a collateral attack is generally inappropriate if 
the possibility of further direct review remains open: 
 
       A district court should not entertain a habeas corpus 
       petition while there is an appeal pending in [the court 
       of appeals] or in the Supreme Court. The reason for the 
       rule is that disposition of the appeal may render the 
       [habeas corpus writ] unnecessary. This is true if the 
       appeal is still pending [in the court of appeals] . . . . It 
       is even more appropriate . . . when review of the 
       conviction is pending before the Supreme Court. 
 
Feldman v Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1320-21 (9th Cir. 
1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This 
is a procedural reality regardless of the probability that the 
Supreme Court will actually grant certiorari. Thus, if a 
defendant files for certiorari review, direct review is 
ongoing, and the commencement of a simultaneousS 2255 
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proceeding would be inappropriate. Accordingly, we hold 
that a judgment of conviction does not become "final" 
within the meaning of S 2255 until the Supreme Court 
affirms the conviction and sentence on the merits or denies 
a timely filed petition for certiorari. Accord United States v. 
Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 744 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Mr. 
Simmonds' conviction became `final' after the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari[.]"). 
 
In addition, if a defendant does not file a certiorari 
petition, the judgment of conviction does not become"final" 
until the time for seeking certiorari review expires. A 
defendant has 90 days from the date on which the court of 
appeals affirms the judgment of conviction tofile a petition 
for a writ of certiorari.3 During that 90-day period, the 
defendant retains the right to seek to overturn the 
judgment of the court of appeals in the Supreme Court. 
Only when the time for seeking certiorari review has 
expired is it appropriate for a defendant to commence a 
collateral attack on the conviction and sentence. See United 
States v. Dorsey, 988 F. Supp. 917, 919 n.3 (D. Md. 1998). 
As the district court explained in Dorsey: 
 
       It makes [little] sense to suggest that a judgment of 
       conviction is "final" for purposes of S 2255 upon 
       completion of direct appeal of right, rather than the 
       conclusion of any petition to the Supreme Court, 
       simply because it is unlikely that the Supreme Court 
       will grant certiorari. If a petitioner should awaitfinal 
       disposition of direct appeal before petitioning for 
       collateral relief, that final disposition should logically 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Supreme Court Rule 13 provides in relevant part: 
 
       1. Unless otherwise provided by law, a petition fo r a writ of 
       certiorari to review a judgment in any case, civil or criminal, 
entered 
       by a state court of last resort or a United States court of appeals 
       (including the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces) 
       is timely when it is filed with the Clerk of this Court within 90 
days 
       after entry of the judgment. A petition for a writ of certiorari 
seeking 
       review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to 
       discretionary review by the state court of last resort is timely 
when 
       it is filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order 
       denying discretionary review. 
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       be when no further avenues for direct appeal exist, not 
       when it becomes increasingly unlikely that such direct 
       appeal will continue. 
 
Id. at 919 (comparing the reasoning in Feldman with the 
district court's analysis here.). 
 
As noted above, the district court's analysis in the 
present case was greatly influenced by the low probability 
of the Supreme Court actually granting discretionary review 
of the decision of a court of appeals. In addition, the district 
court reasoned that its analysis was fortified by, and 
consistent with, Congress's intent in enacting AEDPA. The 
court stated: 
 
       The Court's holding comports with the policy 
       underlying the Act. In amending 28 U.S.C. S 2255, 
       Congress intended to reduce the abuse of habeas 
       corpus that results from delayed and repetitivefilings 
       . . . while preserving the availability of diligently sought 
       review. . . . Defining the date of final judgment of 
       conviction as the date of the appeals court's decision 
       facilitates the congressional intent underlying the 
       AEDPA. Specifically, it counters habeas corpus abuse 
       by definitively limiting the time in which a prisoner 
       may seek S 2255 review, while simultaneously 
       providing ample opportunity for the prisoner to 
       exercise the right to seek relief under S 2255. 
 
Kapral, 973 F. Supp at 498 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). We find, however, that AEDPA's purpose 
is best furthered by an interpretation of S 2255 that 
recognizes the legal reality that the decision of a court of 
appeals is subject to further review, and therefore not 
"final" within the meaning of S 2255 until direct review has 
been completed. Recognizing that one is allowed 90 days to 
file a petition for certiorari does not mitigate the 
congressional objective of imposing time limits where none 
previously existed.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See 142 CONG. REC. H3606 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) ("I introduced this 
legislation . . . to impose a statute of limitations on the filing of 
habeas 
corpus petitions.") (statement of Rep. Hyde). 
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In short, although a defendant has no review as of right 
in the Supreme Court after a conviction is affirmed on 
direct review, a defendant does have a right to petition for 
that review. Thus, we think the district court drew too fine 
a line in distinguishing between review as of right and 
discretionary review for purposes of defining"final" under 
S 2255. 
 
C. 
 
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 320 (1987), the 
Supreme Court had to determine if the rule announced in 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) would be applied to 
convictions that had become final prior to Batson being 
decided. The Court held that, under its precedent, the 
answer to that inquiry required a "three-pronged analysis 
. . . both to convictions that were final and to convictions 
pending on direct review" to determine if Batson applied in 
a particular instance. The Court then stated: "By`final' we 
mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been 
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time 
for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for 
certiorari finally denied." Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321 n.6. 
 
Moreover, in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989), 
the Court held that federal habeas corpus relief based upon 
a "new rule" generally is unavailable if the rule was 
announced after the defendant's conviction and sentence 
became "final." See also Caspari v. Bohlen , 510 U.S. 383, 
389 (1994). In the wake of Teague, "[a] threshold inquiry in 
every habeas case . . . is whether the court is obligated to 
apply the Teague rule to the defendant's claim." Id.; see 
also Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 228 (1994). For 
purposes of a Teague analysis, a defendant's judgment of 
conviction becomes final (1) on the date the Supreme Court 
denies certiorari, see, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 
226 (1991), or (2) on the date the time for filing a timely 
petition for a writ of certiorari expires. See , e.g., Caspari, 
510 U.S. at 384. 
 
As the amicus contends, it would make little sense for 
S 2255's one-year limitation on collateral proceedings to 
begin to run before a legal event that may give rise to a 
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claim for collateral relief -- i.e., the announcement of a new 
rule-- has occurred. Rather, in the interest of the orderly 
administration of direct and collateral proceedings, the first 
day of the one-year limitations period logically should be 
the last day on which any applicable new rule could be 
decided. We find no reason to believe that Congress 
intended to adopt a definition of finality inS 2255 that is 
inconsistent with the concept of finality under a Teague 
analysis. 
 
Furthermore, while Congress has imposed a one-year 
limitation on the commencement of collateral proceedings, 
it does not appear that Congress intended to encourage the 
commencement of collateral proceedings before a defendant 
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his or her 
claims on direct review. Indeed, as the government 
contends, commencing a collateral attack while direct 
review is ongoing would be "wasteful and pointless if the 
conviction is reversed by the Supreme Court." Appellee's Br. 
at 19. The outcome on direct review, even if not in the 
defendant's favor, may also cause the defendant to limit or 
rethink the claims that would be raised on collateral review, 
or even dissuade the defendant from seeking collateral 
review. For these reasons, and to ensure the orderly 
administration of criminal proceedings, defendants have 
long been discouraged from commencing S 2255 
proceedings before the conclusion of direct review. See 
Feldman, supra; United States v. Gordon, 634 F.2d 638, 
638-39 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that "in the absence of 
`extraordinary circumstances' the `orderly administration of 
criminal justice' precludes a district court from considering 
a S 2255 motion while review of the direct appeal is still 
pending"); United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 484 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (same); Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 333 
(5th Cir. 1968) (same); Womack v. United States , 395 F.2d 
630 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (same); Masters v. Eide, 353 F.2d 517, 
518 (8th Cir. 1965) (same); see also Rule 5, Rules 
Governing S 2255 Proceedings, Advisory Committee Note 
(1997) (S 2255 motion "is inappropriate if the movant is 
simultaneously appealing the decision"). 
 
If the one-year limitations period were to run from the 
judgment of the court of appeals, the defendant who elects 
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to file a certiorari petition may well be forced to commence 
a simultaneous collateral proceeding before the Supreme 
Court has ruled. This would only impair the orderly 
administration of criminal proceedings by delaying the 
ultimate resolution of both direct and collateral review. If, 
however, the time for petitioning for certiorari review is 
allowed to expire before the one-year limitation period 
begins to run, collateral proceedings rarely will be 
commenced while direct review is ongoing. Finally, it is 
beyond dispute that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter 
of whether a matter warrants certiorari review, and it 
should have a chance to make that determination before a 
defendant's judgment of conviction is deemed "final"-- a 
label that, in a collateral proceeding, carries a presumption 
that the defendant "stands fairly and finally convicted." 
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164 (1982). 
 
The government argues that interpreting S 2255 to 
include the time for seeking certiorari review serves only to 
delay filing a collateral challenge if a defendant does not 
petition for certiorari, and it argues that this is contrary to 
the congressional intent in enacting AEDPA. Appellee's Br. 
at 20-21. We find this argument unpersuasive. Wefind no 
indication in either the text of AEDPA or its legislative 
history that Congress intended that the judgment of the 
court of appeals would trigger the one-year period for a 
defendant who does not file a certiorari petition. Further, 
we reject the suggestion that waiting until the expiration of 
the 90-day period for seeking certiorari review will somehow 
thwart AEDPA's goal of speeding up the collateral review 
process. Prior to AEDPA, a defendant could file aS 2255 
motion "at any time," see, e.g. , United States v. Nahodil, 36 
F.3d 323, 328 (3d Cir. 1994), and the new one-year 
limitations period, which replaced the "at any time" 
language in S 2255, is certain to prevent defendants from 
delaying the commencement of collateral proceedings. We 
do not believe that the collateral review process will be 
slowed in any meaningful way if defendants are afforded 90 
days to consult with counsel and to consider whether it 
would be appropriate to exercise their right to seek 
certiorari review. 
 
In addition, we reject the suggestion that, because 
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AEDPA has imposed stringent requirements for seeking and 
obtaining collateral relief, S 2255 must be interpreted to 
provide as little time as possible for a defendant to file for 
collateral relief. The "Great Writ" occupies far too important 
a place in our jurisprudence to justify such an assumption 
on the basis of the language of AEDPA.5  No one can deny 
that errors sometimes occur during the course of a criminal 
prosecution, or that depriving an individual of his or her 
liberty is not to be taken lightly. 
 
III. 
 
Our research discloses but one other court of appeals 
that has addressed the precise issue before us. In Gendron 
v. United States, 154 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), 
which was decided after the parties filed their briefs in this 
case, the court held that "federal prisoners who decide not 
to seek certiorari with the Supreme Court will have the 
period of limitations begin to run on the date this court 
issues the mandate in their direct criminal appeal." Id. at 
674. The court reached this conclusion after comparing the 
language of S 2255 with the language of the new limitations 
period for state defendants seeking habeas relief pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 2254. Under S 2244(d)(1)(A), which was also 
enacted as part of AEDPA, a one-year period of limitation 
for state defendants begins to run from "the date on which 
the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 
review[.]" 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1)(A). 
 
The Gendron court assumed that "direct review" in 
S 2244(d)(1)(A) means "review in the state's highest court," 
and noted that "Congress explicitly included the time for 
seeking leave to appeal with a state supreme court even if 
the petitioner elected not to do so." 154 F.3d at 674. The 
court further noted that "[s]uch additional language is 
lacking in S 2255." Id. The court inferred from this 
difference that "Congress intended to treat the period of 
limitations differently under the two sections," id., and it 
concluded that the judgment of a federal defendant who 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 2255 "afford[s] federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope 
to 
federal habeas." Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974). 
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chooses not to seek certiorari review becomes final when 
the court of appeals issues its mandate. We are 
unpersuaded by this analysis. We do not think the Gendron 
analysis affords adequate weight to the context of collateral 
proceedings so central to an analysis of finality under 
S 2255. 
 
Moreover, as is discussed in more detail in section V of 
this opinion, neither the court in Gendron nor the district 
court here considered the wording of the limitations 
provision contained in Chapter 154 of Title 28, which was 
enacted into law as part of AEDPA. We believe this 
omission undermines the holding of both of those courts. 
 
As noted above, the language of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1) 
parallels S 2255. The former provision sets forth the 
limitation period for persons held in state custody whose 
collateral challenges are governed by 28 U.S.C.S 2254. 
Section 2244(d)(1) provides in relevant part: 
 
       A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
       application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 
       custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 
       limitation period shall run from the latest of-- 
 
        (A) the date on which the judgment becamefinal by 
       the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the 
       time for seeking such review[.] . . . 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Since S 2244 
specifically states that a state judgment of conviction 
becomes "final" upon the "conclusion of direct review or by 
the expiration of the time for seeking such review," it may 
at first appear that the absence of similar modifying 
language in S 2255 reflects a congressional intent to have 
the limitations period in the latter begin to run without 
regard to any additional period that may be consumed by 
an attempt to win discretionary review from the Supreme 
Court. However, neither the statutory scheme nor judicial 
precedent supports that interpretation. 
 
We have not previously had occasion to interpret 
S 2244(d)(1)(A) in the context presented here. However, the 
similarity between that provision and S 2255 requires that 
we consider whether the text of the former furthers our 
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inquiry into Congress's intent in drafting the latter.6 
Notably, the district court and the court in Gendron did just 
that, opining that the different language of the two 
provisions "warrants individually tailored definitions of final 
judgment" for state and federal defendants. Kapral 973 F. 
Supp at 499; Gendron, 154 F.3d at 674. 
 
The government suggests that our recent opinions in 
Burns and Miller have settled the issue of when a judgment 
becomes "final" under S 2244(d)(1)(A), and that those cases 
compel the conclusion that the limitations period under 
S 2255 runs from the date the court of appeals enters its 
judgment if the defendant chooses not to seek certiorari 
review. Appellee's Br. at 24-25. We disagree. 
 
In Burns, we were concerned with whetherS 2244's one- 
year limitation period could be applied retroactively and 
thereby reduce the period for filing to less than one year for 
persons whose convictions and sentences had already 
become "final" prior to AEDPA's enactment. We held that 
the one-year limitation could not be applied to habeas 
petitions that were filed before AEDPA was enacted. See 
134 F.3d at 111. We did not examine the language of 
S 2244 in an attempt to determine when Congress intended 
a state conviction to become final for purposes of starting 
the one-year period in which habeas petitions must be filed. 
To the extent that we did comment upon the text ofS 2244, 
we stated that "federal inmates who wish to file motions . . . 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 must adhere to a one-year period 
of limitations virtually identical to that ofS 2244(d)(1)." Id. at 
111-12 (emphasis added). That is consistent with our 
decision here. 
 
In Miller, we were asked to decide if the one-year filing 
requirement of S 2244 is jurisdictional. There, a state 
inmate alleged that he was prevented from meeting the one- 
year deadline because he had been transferred to different 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Our usual practice in AEDPA cases also counsels us to use this 
opportunity to interpret S 2244. See Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 n.1 ("[W]e 
have followed the practice, whenever we decide an AEDPA issue that 
arises under S 2254 and the same holding would analytically be required 
in a case arising under S 2255, or vice versa, of so informing the 
district 
courts."). 
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institutions thus hindering his compliance with the one- 
year requirement. We stated that if the requirement was 
jurisdictional, the district court would lack subject matter 
jurisdiction, but if it were intended only as a period of 
limitations, the court must apply the doctrine of equitable 
tolling to determine if the period had run. We held that the 
one-year period was a period of limitations, and remanded 
for a consideration of whether the petitioner could establish 
such unfairness as to toll the rigid application of the one- 
year period. In so doing, we again noted the similarity 
between S 2244 and S 2255 and held that the latter was 
also subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling. See 145 
F.3d at 618 n.1. That is consistent with our analysis here, 
and to the extent that our discussion in either Miller or 
Burns suggests that the definition of "final" in S 2244 and 
S 2255 differs, our discussion would have been dicta and 
would not control our current inquiry. See Patel v. Sun Co., 
Inc., 141 F.3d 447, 462 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing 
the meaning of "dictum" and the reasons why it need not 
be given any weight). 
 
While the term "direct review" is not defined in 
S 2244(d)(1)(A), it is axiomatic that direct review of a state 
court criminal judgment includes the right to seek 
certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court. See 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) ("[T]he process 
of direct review . . ., if a federal question is involved, 
includes the right to petition this Court for a writ of 
certiorari."); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 232 (1964) ("In 
the present case, the [state court judgment] is not yet final, 
for it is on direct review in this Court."); see also Bradley v. 
United States, 410 U.S. 605, 607 (1973) ("At common law, 
the repeal of a criminal statute abated all prosecutions 
which had not reached final disposition in the highest court 
authorized to review them."); Webb v. Beto , 457 F.2d 346, 
348 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (refusing "[t]o classify a 
judgment as not final while the case is on appeal to the 
highest state court, but final afterwards, even though on 
appeal to the United States Supreme Court"). Therefore, a 
state court criminal judgment is "final" (for purposes of 
collateral attack) at the conclusion of review in the United 
States Supreme Court or when the time for seeking 
certiorari review expires. Accord Ross v. Artuz , 150 F.3d 97, 
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98 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Ross's conviction becamefinal [under 
S 2244(d)(1)(A)] when his time to seek direct review in the 
United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari 
expired[.]"). 
 
The omission of S 2244's clarifying language from the 
mention of "final" in S 2255 is not sufficient to cause us to 
conclude that Congress intended a different concept of 
finality for state and federal defendants. As discussed 
above, that concept includes the period in which a 
defendant can seek discretionary review. Prior to the 
expiration of the time for certiorari review, a conviction is 
simply not "final" under either provision. 
 
We also see no principled reason to treat state and 
federal habeas petitioners differently. Congress has used 
the term "final" to describe the type of judgment that will 
trigger the limitations period for both classes of petitioners. 
Section 2244(d)(1) and 2255's limitations periods were 
enacted as part of AEDPA, and both provisions are found in 
Chapter 153 of Title 28. Therefore, Congress's more lucid 
definition of "final" in S 2244(d)(1)(A) suggests that a 
judgment likewise becomes "final" within the meaning of 
S 2255 only when direct review in the United States 
Supreme Court has concluded. See Sorenson v. Secretary of 
Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986) ("The normal rule of 
statutory construction assumes that identical words used 
in different parts of the same act are intended to have the 
same meaning.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); 
see also Baskin v. United States, 998 F. Supp. 188, 199 (D. 
Conn. 1998) (relying on the more descriptive language of 
S 2244 to hold that S 2255's limitations period begins to run 
at "the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the 
time for seeking such review").7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Of course, canons of construction are not absolute and must yield 
when other indicia of congressional intent suggest a different result. We 
find that AEDPA' language does not suggest a different result. We are, of 
course, aware that the difference between the wording of S 2244(d)(1)(A) 
and S 2255 could simply be the result of imprecise draftsmanship, and 
not at all an expression of congressional intent. See generally Lindh v. 
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, ___, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997) ("[I]n a world 
of silk purses and pigs' ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of the art of 
statutory drafting."). 
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The government argues that "[b]ecause the requirement 
of exhaustion and the interest of comity play no part in 
actions by federal prisoners, the language of S 2244(d)(1) 
accommodating those concerns has no bearing or effect on 
the differently-worded [sic] S 2255." Appellee's Br. at 27. We 
disagree. While the exhaustion requirement generally is 
satisfied if the defendant's claims are fairly presented 
through to the state's highest court for review, see, e.g., 
Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 138 (3d Cir. 1996), the 
meaning of "exhaustion" does not further our analysis of 
the proper interpretation of S 2244(d)(1)(A). Section 
2244(d)(1)(A) does not provide that the one-year period 
begins to run on the date the petitioner's claims are 
"exhausted"-- a term that Congress could easily have 
employed in the statute if that is what it meant. Rather, 
S 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that the limitation period begins to 
run at the "conclusion of direct review or the expiration of 
the time for seeking such review." That includes the right to 
review in the United States Supreme Court, and it is settled 
that the "conclusion of direct review" is not synonymous 
with "exhaustion of available state court remedies." See 
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 681 (1948) (holding that, 
although certiorari review is part of the direct review 
process, an application for certiorari is not required to 
satisfy the exhaustion requirement). 
 
IV. 
 
Although we find that the distinction between the 
wording of S 2244(d)(1)(A) and S 2255 is insignificant insofar 
as a definition of "final" is concerned, we do find the 
distinction in the context in which Congress used"final" 
there as opposed to Chapter 154 of Title 28 to be 
significant. As mentioned above, we believe the analysis of 
both the court in Gendron and the district court here is 
undermined by the failure of those courts to consider the 
wording of Chapter 154 when interpreting S 2255. 
 
Congress enacted a new Chapter 154 of Title 28 as part 
of AEDPA. That Chapter sets forth the procedures that 
govern S 2254 petitions filed by state prisoners serving 
capital sentences in states that meet certain conditions set 
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forth in the statute ("opt-in jurisdictions"). See 28 U.S.C. 
S 2261. Section 2263 provides in relevant part: 
 
        (a) Any application under this chapter for habeas 
       corpus relief under section 2254 must be filed in the 
       appropriate district court not later than 180 days after 
       final State court affirmance of the conviction and 
       sentence on direct review or the expiration of the time 
       for seeking such review. 
 
        (b) The time requirements established by subsection 
       (a) shall be tolled-- 
 
        (1) from the date that a petition for certiorari is 
       filed in the Supreme Court until the date of final 
       disposition of the petition if a State prisonerfiles the 
       petition to secure review by the Supreme Court of 
       the affirmance of a capital sentence on direct review 
       by the court of last resort of the State or otherfinal 
       State court decision on direct review[.]. . . 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2263(a)-(b)(1). 
 
Significantly, the limitations period in S 2263 runs from 
"final State court affirmance of the conviction and sentence 
on direct review." Congress's use of "State court" to modify 
the well-settled meaning of direct review (which includes 
the right to seek review in the Supreme Court), provides 
strong support for the conclusion that the limitations 
periods under S 2244 and S2255 - which lack an analogous 
modifier - run from the conclusion of Supreme Court 
review. In SS 2244 and 2255, Congress spoke in terms of 
"finality", not in terms of "affirmance." 
 
Moreover, under S 2263, the limitations period begins to 
run before the defendant files a certiorari petition, as the 
statute expressly provides that the limitations period is 
"tolled" on the date a certiorari petition isfiled. Sections 
2244(d)(1)(A) and 2255, in contrast, do not expressly call 
for a tolling for certiorari proceedings. Tolling is 
unnecessary if the limitations period begins to run only 
after certiorari review has been completed. We believe that 
Congress did not mention tolling in S 2244 orS 2255 
because Congress assumed tolling was unnecessary since it 
did not intend the limitations period to begin until after the 
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time for certiorari review expired. Had Congress intended 
the limitations period to begin upon the conclusion of an 
appeal as of right, it would have provided for tolling to allow 
for a petition for certiorari to be acted upon, just as it did 
in Chapter 154. 
 
V. 
 
To summarize, we hold that a "judgment of conviction 
becomes final" within the meaning of S 2255 on the later of 
(1) the date on which the Supreme Court affirms the 
conviction and sentence on the merits or denies the 
defendant's timely filed petition for certiorari, or (2) the date 
on which the defendant's time for filing a timely petition for 
certiorari review expires. If a defendant does not pursue a 
timely direct appeal to the court of appeals, his or her 
conviction and sentence become final, and the statute of 
limitation begins to run, on the date on which the time for 
filing such an appeal expired. 
 
We affirmed Kapral's conviction and sentence by 
Judgment Order entered on February 13, 1996. Kapral did 
not file a petition for a writ of certiorari. Accordingly, his 
judgment of conviction became final within the meaning of 
S 2255 when his time for filing a petition for a writ of 
certiorari expired. Thus, the one-year period of limitation 
began to run 90 days from February 13, 1996, which was 
Monday, May 13, 1996. Since Kapral's motion wasfiled on 
April 29, 1997, it was timely. 
 
VI. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the district 
court's order dismissing Kapral's S 2255 motion, and we 
will remand this matter for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I join the opinion of the court, but I write separately to 
elaborate on my reasons for disagreeing with the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Gendron v. United States , 154 F.3d 672 
(7th Cir. 1998), which conflicts with our decision here. Both 
Gendron and this case concern the new deadline for filing 
a motion under 28 U.S.C S 2255. The current version of 
S 2255 imposes a one-year period of limitation and provides 
that this limitation period shall run from the latest of four 
specified dates. One of those dates is "the date on which 
the judgment of conviction becomes final." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255. This is the language at issue in both Gendron and 
the case now before us. 
 
If one looks at only the text of S 2255, the phrase "the 
date on which the judgment of conviction becomesfinal" is 
susceptible to two entirely reasonable interpretations. It 
may mean the date on which occurs the last step in the 
process of direct appeal. See The Random House Dictionary 
of the English Language 532 (1967) (defining"final" to 
mean, among other things, "last in place, order, or time"). 
Alternatively, the phrase "the date on which the judgment 
of conviction becomes final" may reasonably be interpreted 
to mean the date on which the conviction is no longer 
subject to reversal by means of the process of direct appeal. 
See id. (defining "final" to mean, among other things, 
"precluding further controversy on the questions passed 
upon"). 
 
These two interpretations produce the same results in 
those cases in which the defendant exhausts the process of 
direct review, i.e., appeals to the court of appeals and then 
petitions for a writ of certiorari. In those cases, the last step 
in the process of direct appeal occurs at the same time 
when the defendant's conviction becomes immune from 
reversal on direct appeal, i.e., when the Supreme Court 
denies certiorari or, if certiorari is granted, when the 
Supreme Court hands down its decision on the merits of 
the case. These two interpretations, however, produce 
different results in those cases, such as this case and 
Gendron, in which the defendant does not exhaust the 
direct-review process. In cases like this one and Gendron, 
the last step in the process of direct appeal occurs when 
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the court of appeals' judgment is entered, but the judgment 
of conviction does not become immune from reversal 
through the process of direct appeal until the time for 
petitioning for certiorari expired -- generally 90 days after 
the entry of the court of appeals' judgment. See  Supreme 
Court Rule 13.1. Thus, in those cases in which a defendant 
appeals to the court of appeals but does not seek certiorari, 
the first interpretation will generally give the defendant one 
year from the entry of the court of appeals' judgment to file 
a motion under S 2255, whereas the second interpretation 
will generally give the defendant 15 months from the entry 
of the court of appeals' judgment to file that motion. 
 
As I have already said, I believe that the text ofS 2255 
may reasonably be interpreted in either of these ways. 
Indeed if I were compelled to choose one interpretation 
based solely on the text of that provision, I wouldfind the 
choice exceedingly hard. Moreover, I think that a 
reasonable legislator could easily choose either 
interpretation. As noted, this choice matters in only those 
cases in which the defendant does not exhaust all of the 
steps of the direct review process, i.e., chiefly in those cases 
in which a defendant does not petition for certiorari. In 
such cases, a legislator could reasonably think that the 
one-year limitation period should begin to run upon the 
entry of the court of appeals' judgment, because all 
defendants, whether or not they petition for certiorari, 
should have one year (and no more) from the end of the 
direct review process to prepare and file a S 2255 motion. 
On the other hand, recognizing that some defendants who 
do not end up petitioning for certiorari nevertheless spend 
some of the time prior to the certiorari deadline considering 
that option, a legislator could reasonably think that such 
defendants should have a full year from that deadline to 
devote to the preparation of a S 2255 motion. Both of these 
policy choices are reasonable, and viewed prospectively the 
difference between them is hardly of much significance. 
 
As both the Gendron court and our panel recognize, 
however, the relevant language in S 2255 must be 
considered together with 28 U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1), which sets 
a one-year period of limitation for the filing of a federal 
habeas petition by a state prisoner. This provision, like the 
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portion of S 2255 at issue in this case, was enacted as part 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"). Moreover, S 2244(d)(1), like the current version 
of S 2255, provides that the limitation period for a state 
prisoner filing a federal habeas petition begins to run from 
the latest of four specified dates, one of which is "the date 
on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 
review." 28 U.S.C. S 2244 (d)(1). Accordingly, we must 
decide what to make of the fact that S 2255 refers to "the 
date on which the judgment of conviction becomesfinal," 
whereas S 2241(d)(1) refers to "the date on which the 
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 
the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 
 
Tackling this problem, the Gendron court invoked a 
canon of interpretation set out in Russello v. United States, 
464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983), viz., that "[w]here Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 
the disparate inclusion or exclusion."1  Noting that Congress 
included the phrase "by the conclusion of direct review or 
the expiration of the time for seeking such review" in 
S 2244(d)(1) but omitted that phrase fromS 2255, the 
Gendron court concluded that the concept of the date on 
which a judgment becomes final must mean something 
different under S 2255 than it does underS 2244(d)(1), and 
the Gendron court then held that under S 2255 a judgment 
becomes final upon the conclusion of direct review. 
 
I would not quarrel with the canon set out in Russello 
even if it were my prerogative to do so, but, I do not agree 
with the Seventh Circuit's use of the canon in Gendron. It 
is important to recognize that this canon does not purport 
to lay down an absolute rule and that, like every other 
canon, it is "simply one indication of meaning; and if there 
are more contrary indications . . . it must yield." Antonin 
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 27 (1997). The way in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Gendron court cited Hohn v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 
(1998), and McNutt v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 
709 
(7th Cir. 1998), which both quoted Russello. 
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which the canon was employed in Russello illustrates how 
it may properly be used. 
 
Russello concerned the interpretation of a provision of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations"(RICO)" 
statute, 18 U.S.C. S 1963(a)(1), which, at that time, 
authorized the forfeiture of "any interest" that a convicted 
RICO defendant had "acquired . . . in violation of [18 
U.S.C.] S 1962," the provision setting out the activities 
prohibited by the RICO statute. The defendant in Russello 
argued that the term "interest" referred only to an interest 
in the RICO enterprise itself and not to profits or proceeds 
derived from racketeering. In rejecting this argument, the 
Supreme Court began with the ordinary meaning of the 
term "interest" and observed, after quoting several 
dictionary definitions, that it was "apparent that the term 
`interest' comprehends all forms of real and personal 
property, including profits and proceeds." 464 U.S. at 21. 
Then, as one of several reasons for rejecting the defendant's 
artificially narrow interpretation of the term"interest," the 
Court invoked the canon upon which the Gendron  court 
relied. Noting that 18 U.S.C. S 1963(a)(1) spoke "broadly of 
`any interest . . . acquired,' " while the very next subsection, 
18 U.S.C. S 1963(a)(2), "reache[d] only `any interest' in . . . 
any enterprise which [the defendant] had established[,] 
operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the 
conduct of, in violation of section 1962,' " the Court 
observed that "[w]here Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.' " 464 U.S. at 23 (citation omitted). 
The Court added: 
 
       We refrain from concluding here that the differing 
       language in the two subsections has the same meaning 
       in each. We would not presume to ascribe this 
       difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship. 
 
Id. 
 
Russello, then, was a case in which the statutory 
language at issue had a plain meaning, an argument was 
made that the statutory language should be interpreted 
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more narrowly than that plain meaning, another provision 
of the same statute used different language to convey that 
narrower meaning, and the Court therefore presumed that 
the provision at issue meant what its language plainly 
stated and did not have the artificially narrow meaning 
explicitly set out in the other, more narrowly crafted 
statutory section. 
 
The situation in the present case is quite different in 
several important ways. Here, the relevant language in 
S 2255, unlike the statutory language at issue in Russello, 
does not have a single, obvious meaning. Instead, as I have 
said, that language may be interpreted in two entirely 
reasonable ways. Moreover, both of these interpretations -- 
that a judgment of conviction becomes final by"the 
conclusion of direct review" and that a judgment of 
conviction becomes final by "the expiration of the time for 
seeking such review" -- are set out in S 2244(d)(1). Invoking 
the Russello canon, the Gendron court says that it is 
refusing to read into S 2255 the extra explanatory language 
contained in S 2244(d)(1), but actually the Gendron court in 
effect reads into S 2255 part of that explanatory language, 
viz., the part that says that a judgment of conviction 
becomes final "by the conclusion of direct review." 28 
U.S.C. S 2244(d)(1). 
 
The Russello canon is based upon a hypothesis of careful 
draftsmanship. See 464 U.S. at 23 ("We would not presume 
to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in 
draftsmanship.") But the Gendron court's interpretation 
produces a result that is inconsistent with that hypothesis. 
According to the Gendron court, the hypothetical careful 
draftsman responsible for crafting S 2255 used the phrase 
"the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes 
final" to mean the date on which direct review concludes, 
even though a careful draftsman would have realized that 
this phrase is susceptible to another, entirely reasonable 
interpretation. Moreover, according to the Gendron court, 
this hypothetical careful draftsman took this approach even 
though he or she included in S 2244(d)(1) language that 
expressly conveys this very meaning, i.e., "by the 
conclusion of direct review." This simply does not make 
sense. A careful draftsman who laid S 2255 andS 2244(d)(1) 
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side by side would not have taken such an approach. 
Rather, a careful draftsman would have realized that, just 
as it was necessary in S 2244(d)(1) to explain what was 
meant by the date on which a judgment became final, so it 
was equally necessary to provide such an explanation in 
S 2255. 
 
For these reasons, it seems unlikely that the disparate 
language in SS 2244(d)(1) and 2255 resulted from a careful 
drafting decision -- and this is borne out by an 
examination of the origins of these provisions. At the 
beginning of the 104th Congress, Senator Dole introduced 
S.3, "The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Improvement Act of 1995," which among other things, 
proposed to reform federal habeas corpus practice. Like 
many prior habeas reform bills introduced during the 
preceding decade, Section 508 of S.3 imposed a limitation 
period for the filing of S 2255 motions and provided for this 
period to run from the latest of four dates, including "the 
date on which the judgment of conviction becomesfinal. 
See, e.g., S.238, "Reform of Federal Intervention in State 
Proceedings Act of 1985," 99th Cong. S 6 (1985). This 
language, of course, is precisely the same as that now 
contained in S 2255. 
 
Another portion of section 508 provided for S 2244 to be 
amended to include a one-year limitation period forfiling a 
federal habeas petition, but this proposed amendment-- 
again following the pattern of prior unsuccessful habeas 
reform bills2 -- differed from the analogous language now in 
S 2244(d)(1). This proposed amendment provided for the 
one-year period to run from the latest of 
 
       "(1) the date on which State remedies are e xhausted; 
 
       "(2) the date on which the impediment to fili ng an 
       application created by State action in violation of the 
       Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, 
       where the applicant was prevented from filing by such 
       State action; 
 
       "(3) the date on which the Federal constitution al right 
       asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See, e.g., id. S 2, 
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       where the right has been newly recognized by the 
       Court and is made retroactively applicable; or 
 
       "(4) the date on which the factual predicate of  the 
       claim or claims presented could have been discovered 
       through the exercise of due diligence." 
 
S.3, 104th Cong. S 508 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 
Several months after S.3 was introduced, Senators 
Specter and Hatch sponsored S.623, the "Habeas Corpus 
Reform Act of 1995," which took a different approach with 
respect to the date on which the limitation period should 
begin to run for federal habeas claims asserted by state 
prisoners. Instead of providing, as S.3 had, for this period 
to begin to run from "the date on which State remedies are 
exhausted," S.623 provided (as S 2244(d)(1) now does) for 
this period begin to run from "the date on which the 
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 
the expiration of the time for seeking such review." S.623, 
104th Cong. S 2 (1995). At the same time, S.623, like 
current S 2244(d)(2), provided for the one-year period to be 
tolled during the pendency of a properly filed state 
application for post-conviction or other collateral review. Id. 
 
Senator Specter's remarks when he introduced S.623 
suggest the reason for this new approach. Senator Specter 
said that it was "necessary to end the abuse in which 
petitioners and their attorneys" then engaged in capital 
cases, viz., waiting until a death warrant was signed before 
filing a federal habeas petition. 141 Cong. Rec. S4592 (daily 
ed. Mar. 24, 1995). Senator Specter also complained about 
"the endless delays" caused by the exhaustion requirement. 
Id. Based on these remarks, it is reasonable to infer that 
the reason for the new approach taken in S.623 was to 
force state prisoners, upon the completion of direct review, 
promptly to commence either a state post-conviction relief 
proceeding (which would toll the limitation period) or a 
federal habeas proceeding. Thus, the phrase "the date on 
which the judgment became final by the conclusion of 
direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 
review" seems to have been employed to make it clear that 
the approach taken in S.3 and prior bills was being 
changed. Unfortunately, S.623 did not modify the language 
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used in S.3 and previous bills concerning the one-year 
period for filing S 2255 motions. 
 
On April 19, 1995, the federal building in Oklahoma City 
was bombed, and on April 27, Senator Dole introduced 
S.735, the "Comprehensive Terrorism Protection Act of 
1995." This bill incorporated the habeas reform provisions 
of S.623. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7597 (daily ed. May 26, 
1995) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); id. at S7585 (remarks of 
Sen. Specter); 141 Cong. Rec. S7803 (daily ed. June 7, 
1995) (remarks of Sen. Specter); 142 Cong. Rec. S3472 
(daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Specter). S.735 
passed the Senate and the House with the relevant 
amendments to SS 2244(d)(1) and 2255 essentially 
untouched.3 
 
Based on the text of SS 2244(d)(1) and 2255 and the 
history set out above, I conclude that S 2255's reference to 
"the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes 
final" and S 2244(d)(1)'s reference to"the date on which the 
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 
the expiration of the time for seeking such review" mean 
the same thing. I reach this conclusion for three chief 
reasons: first, the statutory text strongly suggests that the 
difference in language did not result from a careful drafting 
choice; second, the legislative history suggests that this 
difference in language is instead a product of the vagaries 
of the legislative process; and third, while I think that a 
legislator could reasonably choose to have the one-year 
limitation period begin either when direct review ends or 
when the opportunity for direct review expires, I think it 
would be odd for a legislator to take one approach in cases 
involving federal habeas petitions filed by state prisoners 
and the other in cases involving S 2255 motions filed by 
federal prisoners. Consequently, I believe that a"judgment 
of conviction becomes final," within the meaning of S 2255 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. No house or Senate Report was submitted, and the Conference Report 
contained only one brief reference to this provision. See H.R. Rep. No. 
104-518, at 111, (1996) reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 944 ("This 
title . . . sets a one year limitation on an application for a habeas writ 
. . . ."). 
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on the date when direct review ends and there is no 
opportunity for further direct review. 
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